A General Approach to Network Configuration Verification

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Abstract—We develop an approach to verify network configurations that is (1) general whereas prior work is limited in terms of protocols or features, (2) accurate whereas prior work approximates, (3) complete in that it analyzes all possible sets of routing announcements from external sources rather than just one or some, (4) powerful in that it can verify a wide range of properties such as reachability, path length, fault tolerance, and load balancing, and yet is (5) scalable. Our approach translates unmodified network configurations into a logical formula that captures both control and data plane behaviors. It then uses an SMT solver to determine if the paths that can emerge when the control plane converges satisfy properties of interest. We implement our approach in a tool called Minesweeper and use it to on configurations of 152 real networks from a large cloud provider. While these networks have been operational for years, it found 96 bugs, some of which represent serious security vulnerabilities. We also used Minesweeper on synthetic benchmarks, and found that it can verify rich properties for networks with hundreds of routers in under 5 minutes. This performance is due to a suite of model-slicing and hoisting optimizations we developed, which reduce verification time by over 460x.

1. INTRODUCTION

The control plane of traditional (non-SDN) networks is a complex distributed system. Network devices use one or more protocols to exchange information about topology and paths to various destinations. How they process this information and select paths to use for traffic depends on their local configuration files. These files tend to have thousands of lines of low-level directives, which makes it hard for humans to reason about them and even harder to reason about the network behavior that emerges through their interactions.

As a result, configuration errors that lead to costly outages are all-too-common. Indeed, every few months configuration-induced outages at major networks make the news [1, 25, 23, 3]. Systematic surveys of network outages also show that configuration error is the biggest contributor [20, 15].

One way to combat such errors is through control plane testing tools such as Batfish [11] and C-BGP [22]. Given a concrete environment (i.e., a set of messages from neighboring networks and a network failure scenario), these tools simulate the network control plane to produce the data plane, which can then be checked for properties such as reachability to certain destinations. However, testing is necessarily incomplete. It can only analyze a small number of the enormous set of possible environments. But unfortunately, many errors trigger in some environments and not others [9].

Thus, it is highly desirable to perform control plane verification, which aims to analyze correctness in the face of all possible environments. Verification is more challenging because one cannot simply simulate the control plane with concrete environments. Rather, one must build a model in which the environment is symbolic (i.e., represented as a variable).

Several researchers have considered the network verification problem, but in each case the underlying models are incomplete or inaccurate. For instance, two of the most recent systems, Bagpipe [27] and ERA [9], employ what we call path-based models. They model the flow of symbolic routing messages along a primary network path and then consider the interaction with messages along secondary paths. ERA does not model potential interactions among multiple secondary paths. Consequently, its analysis is sound only for non-reachability (i.e., is A guaranteed not to reach B?), not for reachability (i.e., is A guaranteed to reach B). Bagpipe makes different simplifications. It considers only networks with BGP where border routers are connected in a full mesh and ignores internal topologies, routing protocols, and access control lists (ACLs). Other recent tools are limited as well. For instance, ARC [12] efficiently analyzes all possible failures but not all possible sets of external routing messages; and FSR [26] only models BGP preference ranks as opposed to full control and data plane functionality.

Thus, a fundamental scientific question is still open:

Is it possible to accurately model a network's control and data planes as a function of its symbolic environment such that the model scales sufficiently to enable verification of real networks?

We answer this question in the affirmative, by combining the following ideas from networking and verification literature:

Graphs vs paths. The path-based models above reason about individual network paths. While this approach has proven effective for stateless data plane verification (e.g., HSA [14]), it creates substantial problems for control plane analysis. The distinction is that, in stateless data planes, packets on one path never interfere with those on a different path; but in the control plane, two route announcements can interfere. A routing message along one path may be less preferred than a message over another path, causing it to be dropped when the other message is present. For accuracy, interactions along all paths must be modeled, but there can be an intractably large number of paths. We avoid this problem by using a graph-based model, where rich logical constraints on its edges and nodes encode all possible interactions of route messages. ARC [12] has a graph-based model as well, but
it uses shortest path graphs that cannot capture the policy-based routing of BGP.

In addition to its better accuracy, our model can verify a much richer set of properties, expressed over graphs, rather than properties on paths alone. For example, it can reason about equivalence of routers, load balancing, disjointedness of routing paths, and if multiple paths to the same destination have equal lengths. Such properties are difficult or impossible for path-based models to check, and we show that they are valuable in finding bugs in real configurations.

**Combinational search (not message set computation).** Existing tools to analyze multiple environments [9, 27] eagerly compute the sets of routing messages that can reach various points in the network. However, the full sets are not typically needed and computing them can incur a high cost. Fortunately, the symbolic model checking community has encountered this type of problem before. Rather than iteratively computing sets of messages, one can instead ask for a satisfying assignment to a logical formula that represents all possible message interactions. Suppose a variable \( x_{m,l} \) represents whether a message \( m \) reaches a location \( l \) in the network and \( N \) encodes the network semantics logically. If there exists a satisfying assignment to the formula \( N \land x_{m,l}=true \), then \( m \) can reach \( l \) and all the constraints \( N \) imposed by interacting messages will also be satisfied. The advantage of this formula-based approach is that while model checking with message set computation is PSPACE-complete [5, 24], the search for a satisfying assignment in the related bounded model checking problem [4] is NP-complete. The intuition behind lower complexity is that searching for a satisfying assignment avoids computing many intermediate message sets. In practice too, modern SAT [17] and SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) [7] solvers routinely solve large instances of such combinatorial search problems in hardware and software verification.

**Stable paths problem.** To realize an approach based on graphs and combinational search, we need to convert the distributed message-passing of the control plane into an equivalent logical formula. Here, we turn to the work of Griffin et al. [13], who showed that network control planes (BGP in particular) solve the stable paths problem, and these paths can be described by constraints on edges. Consequently, rather than encoding message exchanges, we can encode the corresponding set of edge constraints in our formula, such that satisfiable assignments correspond to stable paths in the control plane. Our formula captures all possible environments as symbolic variables, and we can also add constraints related to properties of interest to perform verification.

**Slicing and hoisting optimizations.** Our default encoding of the network control plane produces large formulas that cannot be solved quickly for real networks. We have discovered a range of highly effective optimizations that reduce the number of variables and constraints in our generated formulae enormously. One class of optimizations is slicing, which analyzes the formula to remove variables and constraints that cannot affect the final outcome. A second class of optimizations is hoisting, which lifts repeated computations out of their logical context and precomputes them once. Intuitively, such optimizations are effective because real networks have simpler control planes than the theoretical worst case. For instance, in theory messages can be arbitrarily modified when sent to neighbors (implying the need for different variables for messages to different neighbors), but in practice the same message is sent to multiple neighbors (allowing shared variables). Similarly, while different routers may have arbitrarily different control plane logic in theory, in practice many routers share parts of their configurations.

We implement the concepts above in our Minesweeper tool, and apply it to many real and synthetic networks. Across the 152 small to medium real networks that we analyzed for two properties, we found 96 new bugs, despite the fact that these networks were in production use for years. One class of bugs poses a serious security threat: the management interface IP of the routers could be “hijacked” by external neighbors by sending specific routing announcements. Our experiments with synthetic networks show that Minesweeper can verify a rich set of properties such as many-to-one reachability, bounded path length, and device equivalence in under 5 minutes on networks with 100s of routers. Our optimizations are key to this performance. They help reduce verification time by a factor of up to 460x for larger networks.

**Summary.** Minesweeper is the first network configuration verification tool that can \( i \) generate a complete, accurate, symbolic model of the network control and data planes; as well as \( ii \) verify a wide range of properties for networks of substantial size.

2. **MOTIVATION**

Our approach represents two significant departures from existing work on configuration analysis: \( i \) using general graphs, instead of source-destination paths; and \( ii \) using combinational search, instead of eagerly computing message sets. This section provides intuition behind these choices.

2.1 **Paths vs. graphs**

Consider the network in Figure 1(a). It has three internal routers, R1 to R3, that run OSPF. It connects to three external neighbors, N1 to N3, via BGP. The internal routers are connected to subnets, S1 to S3, whose address prefixes they redistribute into OSPF. R1 and R2 connect via iBGP, to share the BGP routes they hear from N[1..3]. They also redistribute BGP destinations into OSPF, so that R3 can reach those destinations, and OSPF into BGP so that internal subnets are announced externally. The BGP preferences of R1 and R2 are as shown: R1 (R2) prefers routes through N2, N1, and N3 (N3, N2, N1) in that order. Recall that in BGP, when multiple routes are available to the same destination, a router will select and share the most preferred one.
Figure 1: (a) An example network. (b) Its protocol-level decomposition. (c) Routing information flow for BGP at R1.

Suppose we want to ensure that the subnet S3 uses N1 to reach any external destination even when all three of N1, N2 and N3 announce a path to that destination. Does this property hold in our network? The correct answer is positive, but interestingly, the answer a configuration analysis tool delivers depends on the sophistication with which it reasons about the interactions of control plane messages on different paths.

- If the analysis only considers the path N1-R1-R3, it will conclude that the property holds. R1 will select the route through N1 since no other route is available and pass it to R3. Thus, R3 (and S3) will send traffic through N1. (Data flows in the opposite direction to routing information.)
- If the analysis additionally considers the routing path N2-R2-R1-R3 (which interferes with the first path at router R1), it will conclude that the property does not hold. R1 will select the route through N2 and thus the route through N1 will not reach R3.
- If the analysis also considers N3-R2-R1-R3 (which interferes with the second path at R2 and the first path at R1), it will conclude once again that the property holds. R2 will select the route through N3, and thus R1 will select and propagate to R3 the route through N1.

In the general case, all possible paths can interfere with one another, and for correct analysis, all mutual interactions should be considered. But the number of paths can be enormous: \( O(V^2) \), where \( V \) and \( E \) are the number of nodes and edges (and thus \( E/V \) is the average node degree). Existing path-based tools circumvent this problem by restricting the networks they can analyze (e.g., Bagpipe) or conducting an approximate, potentially unsound analysis (e.g., ERA).

Our model avoids this problem by constructing a compact representation for all possible paths—a graph. The complexity of this structure is \( O(V + E) \). Our graph accurately (and symbolically) models all interactions between different paths and supports a richer set of properties (described later).

2.2 Message sets vs. combinational search

One possible approach to control plane verification is to simulate all possible outcomes of the distributed control plane computation by computing (symbolic) sets of messages for all destinations at once. Once all outcomes of the control plane computation have been computed, one can analyze the complete set of possible final states and judge if the property of interest holds. Unfortunately, this approach often leads to a lot of unnecessary work.

In many cases, computing a full solution to the control plane computation is often unnecessary as the validity of the property may not depend upon many parts of that solution. In contrast, our approach encodes both the network and the property in question as a logical formula. As the SMT solver searches for a satisfying assignment to the formula, it will take the property into account. If the property does not require knowledge of some aspects of the control plane, the search process may ignore that part of the model. For example, if router R3 has an ACL that drops traffic sent to R1, then the solver might quickly learn that S3 will not be able to reach N1 without reasoning about the full control plane behavior. In Section 8, we show how many properties can be checked much more efficiently for this reason.

In addition, approaches that compute message sets represent and store all possible outcomes of the control plane’s full fixed point computation and they find all violations of the property at once. In contrast, our approach searches for just one outcome of the control plane computation that violates the given property. The latter can be done extremely efficiently by modern SMT solvers in many domains. While our approach will not find all violations at once, finding just one violation can help pinpoint a bug. When that bug has been fixed, one can apply the procedure again.

3. THE BASIC NETWORK MODEL

Our goal is to enable network operators to verify the behavior of their network under any possible environment. To provide this capability, we model the network with respect to a packet as a function of its environment. Because the packet and the environment are symbolic, our model can verify the control and data plane behavior of the network relevant to any packet under any environment.

More specifically, we generate \( F \), a system of SMT constraints defined as the conjunction of \( N \), the behavior of the network, given the current configurations of all routers, and \( \neg P \), a negated property of interest to the operator. Satisfying
solutions for \( N \) correspond to stable forwarding paths in the network. Thus, any stable solution (even among multiple ones) that violates the property will be reported as a satisfying solution for \( F \). However, if \( F \) is unsatisfiable, then either all stable paths satisfy the property, or the network has no stable paths for the destination(s) of interest.

This section describes the techniques we use to generate a basic network model \( N \) using Figure 1 as a running example. We explain, in turn, how to model (1) a data packet, (2) the interactions between routing protocols, (3) the control plane information, (4) the import and export filters in router configurations, (5) the route selection process, and (6) the access control lists that apply to data packets. We end this section with (7) an example encoding of a property \( P \). Throughout this section, we refer to Figure 2, which lists the main symbolic variables used in our generated formulae. §4 discusses extensions to the basic model, and §5 discusses many additional properties.

(1) Modelling data plane packets. The first section of Figure 2 lists the main variables used to represent a symbolic data packet. For instance, the packet’s destination IP is modelled by the integer variable dstIP, which ranges from 0 to \( 2^{32} - 1 \). We model other fields similarly. If operators wish to ask about a specific destination, such as 10.0.0.0, they may issue a query that constrains our model to consider only packets with that destination (e.g., using the formula dstIP = 10.0.0.0 in their property \( P \)). If they instead wish to ask about packets with any destination IP, they may leave the dstIP field unconstrained. Traditional (non-SDN) networks do not typically modify packet headers\(^1\)—they only forward or block them. Consequently, we use only one, global copy of each of these variables in our formula.

In order to determine what happens to such packets in the network, we must, of course, model the control plane protocols and how they decide to forward packets.

(2) Modeling protocol interactions. Routers commonly run multiple protocol instances, each of which operates independently and selects a best route for a destination prefix based on the information from (i) its remote peers; and (ii) redistribution from other local instances. Figure 1(b) presents a protocol-level view of the internal routers in our example. Here, routers R1 and R2 run BGP to exchange routes with the outside world and OSPF to communicate internally. CON denotes connected routes, i.e., those known through a directly connected interface: we model them as if they are their own protocol, which allows us to avoid special cases.

Figure 1(c) zooms into R1’s BGP instance. Each node is a protocol instance and each edge represents information flow between two instances. For example, the nodes R1 OSPF and R1 BGP represent protocols OSPF and BGP on router R1. Since OSPF redistributes into BGP, and vice versa, there are edges back and forth between R1 OSPF to R1 BGP. The outgoing edge from R1 CON indicates that the connected routes

\(^1\)Except for TTL and CRC fields, which we do not currently model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rep.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data plane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dstIP</td>
<td>Packet destination IP addr</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>srcIP</td>
<td>Packet source IP addr</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dstPort</td>
<td>Packet destination port</td>
<td>(0, 2^{16})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>srcPort</td>
<td>Packet source port</td>
<td>(0, 2^{16})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protocol</td>
<td>Packet Protocol</td>
<td>(0, 2^{8})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control plane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prefix ( r )</td>
<td>Prefix for record ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>length ( r )</td>
<td>Prefix length for ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad ( r )</td>
<td>Administrative distance for ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{8})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lp ( r )</td>
<td>BGP local preference for ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metric ( r )</td>
<td>Protocol metric for ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{16})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>med ( r )</td>
<td>BGP MED attribute for ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rid ( r )</td>
<td>Neighbor router ID for ( r )</td>
<td>(0, 2^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>controlfwd ( x, y )</td>
<td>x fwwds to y (ignores ACLs)</td>
<td>1 bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>datafwd ( x, y )</td>
<td>x fwwds to y (includes ACLs)</td>
<td>1 bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failed ( x, y )</td>
<td>Is the link from ( x ) to ( y ) failed</td>
<td>[0, 1]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Selected symbolic variables from the model

are redistributed into BGP. Since R1 uses BGP with the external neighbor N1 and R2, there are edges in both directions between R1 BGP and N1 and R2 BGP.

(3) Encoding control plane information. To model the control plane, we need to encode the information in the messages exchanged by protocol instances. We do so using records of symbolic values, which roughly correspond to protocol messages. As with the data packets, constraints may map these variables to specific concrete values (e.g., the prefix 10.1.0.0/24) or may leave them fully or partially unconstrained, allowing them to represent multiple possible values.

Unlike the single symbolic data packet, there are many control plane records in our encoding. The edge labels in Figure 1(c) indicate the presence of a specific record. Consider the edge between R2 BGP and R1 BGP. The label e4 represents the messages exported by R2’s BGP process on the link to R1; and the label in4 represents the messages after traversing R1’s BGP import filter on the link from R2. Naturally, the messages defined by in4 and e4 are closely related. We encode the relationship using SMT constraints generated from import filters in R1’s configuration.

Routing messages from the environment are represented as records from an external neighbor. For example, the record e2 is the export from neighbor N1, and left unconstrained, it represents the fact that N1 could send any message.

The second section of Figure 2 lists the main fields of symbolic control plane records. Each record is for a destination prefix of a particular length. Announcements for that prefix are annotated with the administrative distance (ad). When multiple protocol instances offer a route to the same
prefix, this measure (which is configured for each protocol) determines which one is used for forwarding. These records also contain the local preference (lp) for BGP, and the metric. The metric is a protocol-specific measure of the quality of the route. For instance, it is path length for BGP and path cost for OSPF. When routes are redistributed from one protocol to another, the configuration determines the initial metric that the router will use. The router id (rid) is used to break ties among equally-good routes. Other protocol-specific attributes such as the BGP multi-exit discriminator (med) are included in each such symbolic record. Finally, every record contains one special boolean field, called valid. If valid is true, then a message is present and the remaining contents of the record are meaningful; otherwise, they are not meaningful (e.g., no message arrives at this location).

Because we are interested in the behavior with respect to a single symbolic packet, we only want to consider control plane messages for prefixes that impact this packet. The valid field of a control plane record will only be true if

(i) a message is present (e.g., advertised from a neighbor), and
(ii) the control plane destination prefix applies to the data plane destination IP of the packet of interest. We capture this latter fact with the constraint:

\[ e.\text{valid} \implies \text{FBM}(e.\text{prefix}, \text{dstIp}, e.\text{length}) \]

The function FBM (first bits match) tests for equality of the first \(e.\text{length}\) bits of the prefix \(e.\text{prefix}\) and destination IP, thus capturing the semantics of prefix-based forwarding.²

(4) Encoding router configurations. Each router configuration defines (possibly per neighbor) filters that can either drop or modify protocol messages. As an example, consider the following configuration fragment for router R1:

\[
\text{ip prefix-list L deny 192.168.0.0/16 le 32} \\
\text{ip prefix-list L allow} \\
\text{route-map M 10} \\
\text{match ip address prefix-list L} \\
\text{set local-preference 120}
\]

This fragment blocks control plane announcements for any prefix that matches the first 16 bits of 192.168.0.0, and has prefix length between 16 and 32. It sets the local preference attribute to 120 for any other prefixes. Assuming R1’s BGP process is configured with this fragment as an import filter then we use it to define the relationship between the symbolic records \(e_4\) and \(in_4\) in Figure 1(c). More specifically, the filter is realized by the formula in Figure 3. The first line in this formula ensures that there can be an advertisement at \(in_4\) only if R2 exports an advertisement to \(e_4\) and the R1–R2 link is not failed (R2 would only export to \(e_4\) if the link is not failed as well). The second condition implements the import filter. If the two conditions are met, then information from R2 will arrive at R1. Hence, we set the valid bit of \(in_4\), ensure the local preference is 120, and ensure \(in_4\),’s other fields are the same as \(e_4\)’s. In other cases, no advertisement arrives at R1, so its valid bit must be false.

Such translation of import filters to symbolic constraints can also capture route redistribution where routes learned in one protocol are transferred to another. Users can set custom metric and administrative distance values for route redistribution, which would be updated as in the above example.

(5) Encoding the control plane decisions. Each protocol instance executes a decision process that selects a best route for a given IP prefix based on those available. For example, the routes available to R1’s BGP instance may include routes from R2’s BGP instance, R1’s OSPF and connected instances. Thus, the available routes here are defined by the status of the symbolic records \(in_2\), \(in_4\), \(in_5\), and \(in_7\). The available routes are ordered by the decision process in a standard way. For instance, BGP first prefers the route with the highest administrative distance, then if those are equal, the highest local preference, then highest metric, etc. We implement this ordering via a relation \(r_1 \preceq r_2\), which may be read as “\(r_1\) is preferred over \(r_2\).” The selected route is the one that is both available (the valid bit is set) and highest in the ordering. Logically, our encoding introduces a new symbolic record \(\text{best}_\text{prot}\) for each protocol instance prot. Each such record is equated with the highest available route in the order. For instance, for R1’s BGP process, if no input \(in_1\) is valid then \(\text{best}_\text{prot}\) is not valid. Otherwise:

\[
\bigwedge_{i \in \{2,4,5,7\}} \text{best}_\text{BGP} \preceq in_i \quad \wedge \quad \bigvee_{i \in \{2,4,5,7\}} \text{best}_\text{BGP} = in_i
\]

This constraint states that best record is less than all alternatives and equal to one of them. It is linear in size.

Each router installs only one route in its data plane, which is then used to forward traffic. Thus, it chooses a best route among all running protocols. Once again, this can be modelled with a new symbolic record \(\text{best}_\text{overall}\), which is similarly constrained to be the best among all the \(\text{best}_\text{prot}\) records. After selecting a best route, each protocol will then export messages to each of its peers after potentially processing these messages through peer-specific export filters. The en-

\[\text{if } e_4.\text{valid} \land \text{failed}_{R1,R2} = 0 \text{ then} \]
\[\text{if } \neg (\text{FBM}(e_4.\text{prefix}, 192.168.0.0, 16) \land 16 \leq e_4.\text{length} \leq 32) \]
\[\text{then} \]
\[\text{in}_4.\text{valid} = \text{true} \]
\[\text{in}_4.\text{lp} = 120 \]
\[\text{in}_4.\text{ad} = e_4.\text{ad} \]
\[\text{in}_4.\text{prefix} = e_4.\text{prefix} \]
\[\text{in}_4.\text{length} = e_4.\text{length} \]
\[\text{...} \]
\[\text{else } \text{in}_4.\text{valid} = \text{false} \]
\[\text{else } \text{in}_4.\text{valid} = \text{false} \]

Figure 3: Sample translation of an import filter.
coding of an export filter is similar to the encoding of an import filter shown earlier. The main difference is that it will connect a record for a protocol decision process, such as R1’s bestBGP, with a record on an outgoing edge of a router, such as outx, and then update the protocol metric to account for the change in path cost.

To represent the final forwarding decision of the router, we introduce a new boolean variable controlfwdx,y for each edge in the network between routers x and y. The variable indicates that router x decides to forward traffic for the destination to router y. Intuitively, router x will decide to forward to router y if the message received from y is equal to the best choice. For example, to determine if R1 will forward to R2, we use the following constraint:

\[
\text{controlfwd}_{R1,R2} = (e_4.\text{valid} \land e_4 = \text{best}_{\text{overall}})
\]

(6) Encoding data plane constraints. Although routers decide how to forward packets in the control plane through their decision process, the actual data plane forwarding behavior can differ due to the presence of an access control list (ACL), which lets a router block traffic directly in the data plane. To handle ACLs, we create additional, separate variables to represent the final data plane forwarding behavior of the network. For each variable controlfwdx,y, we create a corresponding datafwdx,y variable. The data plane forwarding will be the same as the control plane forwarding modulo any ACLs. For example, consider the following ACL:

\[
\text{access-list 1 deny ip 172.10.1.0 0.0.0.255}
\]

The mask 0.0.0.255 signifies the wildcard bits for the match. This will therefore block any packets that match destination IP 172.10.1.* in the data plane. This constraint is captured by first translating the ACL to a formula and then joining it with the control plane decision in the following way:

\[
\text{datafwd}_{R1,R2} = \text{controlfwd}_{R1,R2} \land \neg \text{FBM}(\text{dstIP}, 172.10.1.0, 24)
\]

(7) Encoding properties. While the model above captures the joint impact of all possible network interactions, to verify properties of interest we can instrument it with additional variables as needed. For example, suppose we wish to check that router R3 will be able to reach N1 regardless of any advertisements received from neighbors N2-N3. For each router x in the network, we add a variable reachx representing that x can reach the destination subnet. For R1, which is directly connected to N1, we add:

\[
\text{canReach}_{R1} \iff \text{datafwd}_{R1,N1}
\]

For every other router, we say it can reach N1 if it can forward to some neighbor that can reach N1. For router R3:

\[
\text{canReach}_{R3} \iff \bigvee_{R \in \{R1\}} (\text{datafwd}_{R3,R} \land \text{canReach}_R)
\]

Since we are interested in checking that the property holds for any possible packet, we leave the packet fields (e.g., dstIp) unconstrained. Finally, we would assert the negation of the property we are interested, namely \(\neg \text{canReach}_{R3} \) and ask the solver to prove unsatisfiability, thereby ensuring the property holds for all packets and environments.

Limitations. Although our model of the network is highly flexible, it has several limitations. First, because we encode the solution to a stable network control plane directly, this model cannot be used to verify properties about transient states of the network, prior to convergence.

Second, because we only consider control plane messages that influence the forwarding decision for a single symbolic packet, it is harder to pose queries that involve more than one packet (e.g., packet A reaches a server only if packet B reaches the server). This also makes it challenging to model a few features that introduce dependencies among destinations. For example, it is possible for static routes to specify a next hop IP address that does not belong to a directly connected interface, thereby requiring the model to understand how to route to that next hop. In general, there are two ways to resolve this issue. We can either (1) model the semantics of static routes precisely by creating a separate copy of every control plane variable to determine the forwarding for a second packet corresponding to the next hop destination, or (2) overapproximate the behavior of the static route by treating the static route as non-deterministically sending out any port. This overapproximation is sound in that any property verified for the overapproximated network must hold in the real network. None of the real configurations we analyzed used this feature.

4. GENERALIZING THE MODEL

This section describes how we encode several additional features of network configurations.

Link-state Protocols. In link-state protocols, such as OSPF and ISIS, routers share information about the configured cost and state (up or down) of each link. Each router then builds a global view of the network and computes the least-cost path to each destination. These least-cost paths are a special case of stable paths. Each router along the shortest path will send traffic to a neighbor only if that neighbor has a path to the destination and no other neighbor offers a lower cost path. Thus, we can model link-state protocols in the same way as path-vector protocols, simply using different link costs.

Maximum Path Length. Distance-vector protocols (which we model similarly to path-vector protocols) can suffer from the “count-to-infinity” problem, where it takes a long time for the protocol to converge because routers repeatedly learn slightly better paths. To counter this problem, these protocols introduce a maximum hop count (e.g., 15 in RIP), and routes longer than the maximum are discarded. To capture this semantics, we extend the import filters of every router to reject routes that exceed the maximum hop count. In EIGRP, the hop count is distinct from the metric, so it is maintained as a separate variable in each symbolic record.
Static Routes. Static routes are used to tell a router to always forward to a particular next hop IP address, or out a particular interface. As with directly connected routes, we model static routes on each router as their own routing process that decide how to forward based on the destination IP address. The advantage of modelling static routes this way is that it is possible to treat them similarly to other protocols and to model route redistribution where static routes are injected into other protocols.

Aggregation. Aggregation, by which routers announce a less-specific prefix that covers many, more-specific prefixes, is an important technique to reduce the size of the routing tables. We model aggregation as a modification to the prefix length attribute. If a prefix is valid for the destination IP address before aggregation, it will remain valid after aggregation, however the prefix length will be smaller.

Multipath Routing. Our path selection encoding, as described in §3, was limited to a single best path. However, multipath routing is common in modern networks, where to balance load, traffic is spread over multiple equally-good routes. To encode multipath routing, we relax the best route comparison so that it does not compare the router ID. This relaxation makes it so there is no longer a total ordering of preferred routes, and any route as good as the best route will be used.

BGP Communities (not yet implemented). BGP communities are arbitrary strings that can be attached to route advertisements, which other routers can use as part of their policy. We can model community values by introducing a new community variable (community\(y_{x,c}\)) for each router \(x\) for each community \(c\) used in the policy. Vendors allow community values to be added or removed arbitrarily by any router. We apply these transformations simply by updating the value of community\(y_{x,c}\) according to the import/export filter at the router. We plan to implement this feature shortly.

5. PROPERTIES

As noted earlier, our model allows us to express a range of rich properties using SMT constraints. We now show how to encode some common properties of interest.

Reachability and Isolation. We focus on answering reachability queries for a fixed destination port and set of source routers. To answer such a query, each router \(x\) is instrumented with an additional variable canReach\(_x\) representing the fact that the router can reach the destination port. We then add constraints as in Section 3. Isolation is checked by asserting that a collection of routers are not reachable.

One benefit of the graph-based encoding is that queries can involve many routers at once and the solver will analyze their joint impact. For example, to check if two routers \(r_1\) and \(r_2\) can both either reach or not reach the destination, one would assert canReach\(_{r_1} \iff\) canReach\(_{r_2}\). Similarly, the user can check if all routers from a set \(S\) can reach the destination in a single query by checking: \(\bigwedge_{x \in S} \text{canReach}_x\).

In contrast, in existing data plane and control plane verification tools, to answer questions about reachability between all pairs of \(n\) devices, one is typically required to run \(n^2\) separate queries, which can be very expensive [21].

Waypointing. Suppose we want to verify that traffic will traverse a chain of devices \(m_1, \ldots, m_k\). Rather than adding one variable for each router as with reachability, instead we add \(k\) variables for each router to indicate how much of the service chain has been matched. If a router forwards to neighbor \(m_j\) and its \((j-1)\)th variable is true, then the \(j\)th variable must be true for that router. Routers where the \(k\)th variable is true will send traffic through the service chain.

Bounded or Equal Path Length. In many settings, it is desirable to guarantee that traffic follows paths of certain length. For example, for a data center with a folded-Clos topology, an operator may wish to ensure that traffic never traverses a path longer than four hops. A violation of such an invariant likely indicates a configuration bug. Similarly, the operator may want to ensure that all top-of-rack routers in a pod use equal length paths to the destination.

Similar to reachability, path length is easily instrumented in the model by adding a new integer variable for each router in the network. Each router has path length \(n\) to the destination if it forwards to some neighbor with path length \(n - 1\).

Disjoint Paths. It is also possible to ensure that two different routers use edge-disjoint paths to a destination. Given two source routers, we add two bits to each edge indicating whether either router ever forwards through that edge. A constraint then states that both bits are never set for any edge. A similar approach can be used to guarantee that paths do not share nodes or other shared-risk elements (e.g., fiber conduits), by introducing a variable for each risk factor.

Routing Loops. Routing loops in the network can arise from configuration errors in one or more of route redistribution, administrative distances, and static routes. To detect routing loops for a particular router \(r\), we add a single control bit to say whether each other router will eventually send traffic through \(r\). If \(r\) sends traffic to any neighbor with this bit true, then there will be a routing loop. As an optimization, we analyze configurations to identify routers where a routing loop is possible (e.g., due to the presence of static routes). We then add control bits only for these routers.

Black Holes. Black holes occur when traffic is dropped because it arrives at a router that does not have a corresponding forwarding entry. This behavior may be intentional (e.g., in the case of ACLs) or unintentional. We can find black holes by checking if any router has a neighbor that forwards to it, yet the router itself does not forward to any neighbor.

Multipath Consistency. Batfish [11] introduced a property called multipath consistency, which ensures that traffic along all paths from a source is treated the same. A violation of multipath consistency occurs when traffic is dropped along one path but not the other. Consider the example in Fig-
That is, whenever traffic flows along path$_2$ it is because path$_1$ is not available due the advertisement being rejected along one of the edges. A straightforward generalization of the above can help enforce preferences over classes of neighbors, instead of individual neighbors.

**Load Balancing.** Consider the example network in Figure 4(b). Suppose router R1 is configured to use ECMP to send traffic to R2 and R4. We can roughly model the effect of load distribution with the following steps. First, for each router R in the network we introduce a symbolic real number called total$_R$ representing the portion of traffic going through R. For each source router of interest (e.g., R1 and R3), we set the load to some initial value based on traffic measurements (e.g., 1.0 in this example):

$$\text{total}_R = 1.0 \land \text{total}_R = 1.0$$

For each outgoing interface in the network, we add a variable $\text{out}_i$ representing the fraction of the load sent out that interface, which depends on the forwarding behavior.

$$\begin{align*}
\text{out}_1 &= \text{if datafwd}_i \text{R}_1 \text{R}_4 \text{ then } x \text{ else } 0.0 \\
\text{out}_2 &= \text{if datafwd}_i \text{R}_1 \text{R}_2 \text{ then } x \text{ else } 0.0 \\
\text{total}_R &= \text{out}_1 + \text{out}_2
\end{align*}$$

Each interface’s load is equal to the (same) value defined by a single new variable $x$ if traffic is forwarded out the interface, otherwise it is 0. This new variable $x$ ensures the loads are all equal.$^3$ The total at non-source routers is simply the sum of their incoming totals:

$$\text{total}_R = \text{out}_2 + \text{out}_3$$

Now we can ask questions about the load on each node/edge. For example, we can check that the difference between the loads on R2 and R4 is always within some threshold $k$:

$$-k \leq \text{total}_{R2} - \text{total}_{R4} \leq k$$

**Aggregation and Leaking Prefixes.** We can ensure that prefixes are aggregated properly (e.g., a /32 is not leaked to an external network) by checking: whenever the network advertises record $e$ to an external neighbor, then $e$.length = $l$ where $l$ is prefix length after aggregation.

**Local Equivalence.** In many networks (e.g., data centers), several devices will perform a similar “role” (e.g., aggregation router) and have similar configurations. Checks for equivalence can help detect inconsistencies. For example, we might want to know that a particular community value is always attached to advertisements sent to external neighbors.

Because we fully model each router’s interactions with all of its neighbors, we can check if two routers are behaviorally equivalent for some notion of equivalence. In particular, we ask if given equal environments (i.e., peer advertisements), the routers will make the same forwarding decisions and export the same new advertisements. For example, if two

$^3$This could be easily extended to weighted ECMP by scaling $x$ by a constant according to the fraction of traffic split.
routers R1 and R2 have both have the same two peers P1 and P2 with import records in1 and in2, and output records out1 and out2, then we check the following:

\[ in_1 = in_2 \implies (out_1 = out_2) \land (datafwd_{R1,P1} = datafwd_{R2,P1}) \land (datafwd_{R1,P2} = datafwd_{R2,P2}) \]

**Full Equivalence.** It is also possible to check full equivalence between two sets of router configurations. This is done in a similar way as the local equivalence check, by first making two separate copies of the network encoding, and then relating the environments. As before, we check that all the final data plane forwarding decisions and all exports to neighboring networks must be the same as a result.

**Fault Tolerance.** Configurations that work correctly in failure-free environments may no longer work correctly after one or more links in the network fail. For each property above, we can verify that it holds for up to \( k \) failures by adding the following constraint on the number of links that are failed:

\[ \sum_{(x,y) \in \text{edges}} \text{failed}_{x,y} \leq k \]

6. **OPTIMIZATIONS**

While conceptually simple, the naive encoding of the control plane described in §3 does not scale to large networks. We present two types of optimizations that dramatically improve the performance of the control-plane encoding.

6.1 **Hoisting**

Hosting lifts repeated computations outside their logical context and precomputes them once. Two main optimizations of this class that we use are:

**Prefix elimination.** Our naive encoding does not scale well in large part because of the constraints of the form \( \text{FBM}(p_1, p_2, n) \), which checks that two symbolic variables have the first \( n \) bits in common. The natural way to represent \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) for this check is to use 32-bit bitvectors and check for equality using a bit mask. However, bitvectors are expensive and solvers typically convert them to SAT. In our model, this would introduce up to 128 new variables for every topology edge in the network (4 records per edge) thereby introducing an enormous number of additional variables.

To avoid this complexity, we observe that the prefix received from a neighbor does not actually need to be represented explicitly. In particular, because we know (symbolically) the destination IP address of the packet and the prefix length, there is a unique valid, corresponding prefix for the destination IP. For example, if the destination IP is 172.18.0.4 and the prefix length is /24, and the route is valid for the destination, then the prefix must be 172.18.0.0/24\(^4\).

However, we must still be able to check if a prefix is matched by a router’s import or export filter. Somewhat unintuitively, we can actually safely replace any filter on the destination prefix with a different test on the destination IP address directly, thereby avoiding the need to explicitly model prefixes. Consider the following prefix filter:

\[ \text{ip prefix list L allow 192.168.0.0/16 ge 24 le 32} \]

Its semantics is that it succeeds only if the first 16 bits of 192.168.0.0 match the prefix, and the prefix length is between 24 and 32. In general, for a prefix filter of the form \( P/A \geq B \leq C \) to be well formed it must be that \( A < B \leq C \). A simple translation of this to SMT record \( e \) is:

\[ \text{FBM}(e.\text{prefix}, 192.168.0.0, 16) \land (24 \leq e.\text{length} \leq 32) \]

Suppose now, we replace the test on the prefix contained in the control plane advertisement with a test directly on the destination IP address of a packet of interest:

\[ \text{FBM}(\text{dstIp}, 192.168.0.0, 16) \land (24 \leq e.\text{length} \leq 32) \]

There are two cases to consider. First, if \( e.\text{length} \) is not between 24 and 32, then both tests fail regardless, so they are equivalent. Suppose instead, \( e.\text{length} \) is in this range. Recall that, because we are considering a slice of the network with respect to the destination IP address, for the advertisement corresponding to \( e \) to be valid (exist in the network), it must be the case that the prefix contains the destination IP. That is: \( \text{FBM}(e.\text{prefix}, \text{dstIp}, e.\text{length}) \). However, because we know the prefix length falls in the range between 24 and 32, it must be greater than 16. Since the first bits up to the prefix length are common between the destination IP and the prefix, the first 16 bits must also be the same. Therefore the above substitution is equivalent.

Further, because the test \( \text{FBM} \) is now purely in terms of constants in the configuration (not the symbolic prefix length variable), we can represent the destination variable as an integer and implement the test using the efficient theory of integer difference logic (IDL). Thus, we would test that:

\[ (192.168.0.0 \leq \text{dstIp} < 192.168.0.0 + 2^{32-16}) \land (16 \leq e.\text{length} \leq 32) \]

**Loop Detection.** In protocols that support policy-based routing (e.g., BGP), path length alone does not suffice to prevent loops. For this reason, BGP tracks the ASNs (autonomous system numbers) of networks along the advertised path and routers reject paths with their own ASN. We can model this by maintaining, for each BGP router, a control bit saying whether or not the advertised path already went through that router. However, doing so can be expensive since the number of control bit variables grows with the square of the number of routers. Instead, observe that, any BGP router that uses only default local preferences (i.e., only makes decisions based on path length) can never cause a loop, and thus need not maintain a control bit. Similarly, BGP routers that use non-default local preferences only for external peers will also never cause a loop. These two cases together make it possible to forgo modelling loops in most cases.

\(^4\)Alternatives such as 172.18.0.1/24 are treated identically.
6.2 Network Slicing

Slicing removes bits from the encoding that are unnecessary for the final solution. We use the following slicing optimizations:

- Remove symbolic variables that never influence the decision process. For example, if BGP routers never set a local preference, then the local preference attribute will never affect the decision and can be removed.
- Keep a single copy of import and export variables for an edge when there is no import filter on the edge. The two variable sets will simply be copies of each other.
- Keep a single, merged copy of the export record for a protocol when there is no peer-specific export policy.
- Do not model directly connected routes for a router whose interface addresses can never overlap with the destination IP range of interest to the query.
- Merge the data plane and control plane forwarding variables along edges that do not have ACLs.
- Merge per-protocol and overall best records when there is only a single protocol running on a router.

Together, these optimizations are effective at removing a lot of redundant information that the SMT solver might otherwise have to discover for itself.

7. IMPLEMENTATION

We implemented Minesweeper in Java to construct a symbolic control plane model from real network configurations. Minesweeper uses Batfish [11] to parse vendor-specific configurations into a vendor-neutral data format and then translate from that format to the symbolic model. To check for (un)satisfiability of our encoding, Minesweeper uses Z3 [6], a modern, high-performance SMT solver, with the theory of integer difference logic (IDL), as well as several preprocessing steps to simplify formulas before solving. We plan to make Minesweeper available as open source software.

8. EVALUATION

We evaluate Minesweeper by using it to verify a selection of the properties described in Section 5 on both real and synthetic network configurations. In particular, we are interested in measuring (1) the ability of Minesweeper to find bugs in real configurations, which are otherwise hard to find; (2) its scalability for answering various queries on large networks; and (3) the impact of the optimizations described in §6 on performance. All experiments are run on an 8 core, 2.4 GHz Intel i7 processor running Mac OSX 10.12.

8.1 Finding Errors in Real Configurations

We demonstrate Minesweeper’s ability to find bugs in real configurations by applying it on a collection of configurations for 152 real networks. We obtained these from a large cloud provider, and they represent different networks within their infrastructure. The networks range in size from 2 to 25 routers with 1–23K lines of configuration each. These networks have been operational for years, and thus we expect that all easy-to-find bugs have already been ironed out. This data set was also analyzed by ARC [12].

Properties checked. Since we do not have the operator-intended specification of these networks, we focus on two consistency properties expected to hold in such networks:

- Management interface reachability: All nodes in the network should be able to reach each management interface, irrespective of the environment. Management interfaces are used to log into the devices, manage their firmware and configuration, and collect system logs. Uninterrupted access to it is important for the network’s security and manageability.
- Local equivalence: Routers serving the same role (e.g., as “top-of-rack”) should be similar in how they treat packets. We identify routers in the same role by leveraging the networks’ naming convention and check that all pairs of routers in the network in a given role are equivalent.

Violations. We found 67 violations of management interface reachability, that is, cases where a management interface could become unreachable. In each case, the violation occurs only in the presence of a particular announcement from outside. For example, an external BGP advertisement for the same /32 interface prefix with path length \( \leq 1 \) would result in a more preferred route for the destination that would ultimately divert traffic away from the correct interface.

The checks for local equivalence revealed 29 violations. Upon further investigation, we found that each violation was caused by one or more exceptions in ACLs where almost all routers in a given role would have identical ACLs except for a single router with an extra or a missing entry. Such differences are possibly caused by copy and paste type mistakes.
8.2 Verification Performance

We evaluate the performance of Minesweeper to verify different properties on real and synthetic configurations.

**Real configurations.** We benchmarked the verification time for the networks and properties described above. Figure 5 (left) shows this time for management-interface reachability for each network that is configured with at least one management interface. The networks are sorted by total lines of configuration, with more complex networks appearing farther right. We see that the checks take anywhere from 2ms to 60ms for every network tested.

Figure 5 (middle) shows the verification time for local equivalence among routers in each unique role, for all networks with at least two routers in any particular role. Verification time ranges anywhere from roughly 5ms to 400ms. This check is more expensive than management-interface reachability, in part, because it requires more queries.

While the networks we studied are small, the sub-second verification times we observe are encouraging. They point to the ability of Minesweeper to verify real configurations in an acceptable amount of time. Next, we stress test our tool by running it on larger, albeit synthetic networks.

**Synthetic configurations.** To test the scalability of our tool on larger networks, we use a collection of synthesized, but functional, configurations for data center networks of increasing size. In terms of their structure and policy, these networks are similar to those described in Propane [2]. Each data center uses a folded-Clos topology and runs BGP both inside the network as well as to connect to an external backbone network. Each top-of-rack router in the data center is configured to advertise a /24 prefix corresponding to the shared subnet for its hosts. All routers are configured to enable multipath routing to evenly distribute load across all of its available peers. Spine routers in the data center connect to external neighbors in the adjacent backbone network and are configured to use route filters on all externally connected interfaces to block certain advertisements.

For each network, we use Minesweeper check a large collection of the properties described in Section 5. First, we fix a destination ToR and use queries to check both single-source and all-source reachability from other ToRs. Similarly, we also check that both some and all other ToRs will always use a path to the destination ToR that is bounded by four hops, to ensure that traffic never uses a “valley” path that goes down, up, and then down again. To demonstrate a query that asks about more than a single path, we verify that all ToRs in a separate pod from the destination will always use paths that have equal length. This ensures a certain form of symmetry in routing. In addition to path-based properties, we also verify the multipath-consistency property that every router in the network will never have different forwarding behavior along different paths. We also check that every spine router in the network is equivalent using the local-consistency property. To ensure that all spine routers are equivalent, we check for local equivalence among two at a time using \( n - 1 \) separate queries. If all routers are equivalent, then transitively they are equivalent as well. Finally, we verify the absence of black holes in the data center.

Figure 6 shows the time to check each property for different different size data centers. Multipath consistency and the no-blackholes property are the fastest to check, taking under a second to verify in a cases. This speed is in most part due to the minimal use of ACLs in the configurations. The solver quickly realizes that the properties cannot be violated because the control and data planes stay in sync.

The next fastest property to verify is local equivalence among spine routers. This check takes under 2 minutes for the largest network. In this case, each pairwise equivalence check takes roughly 145 milliseconds.

The most expensive properties pertain to reachability and path-length. For the largest network it takes under 5 minutes to verify such properties. Interestingly, queries checking all-source vs single-source take approximately the same amount of time. Instead of being multiple queries, as is the case in many prior, path-based tools [9, 27], all-source reachability is a single query in our graph-based formulation.

8.3 Optimization Effectiveness

We conclude our evaluation by quantifying the effectiveness of the optimizations from Section 6. We focus on the verification time for a single-source reachability query. Fig-
ure 5 (right) shows the cumulative speedup from each of the three types of optimization. The prefix-hoisting optimization that replaces symbolic variables representing an advertised prefix with instances of the global destination IP variable has a large impact on performance, speeding up verification by over 200x. This is due to the fact that bitvectors are expensive for SMT solvers. Solvers typically deal with bitvectors by “bit blasting” them into SAT. However, this introduces 32 extra variables for every logical edge in the graph. The next two optimizations: merging common import and export records of variables and specializing variables by protocol, are both forms of slicing optimizations. Together, these optimizations improve the performance of the solver roughly 2.3x over prefix hoisting alone.

9. RELATED WORK

Our work builds on prior work on network configuration analysis, which we divide into three classes:

(1) Analysis without network models. Early configurations analysis tools such as rcc [10] and IP Assure [19] focused on common mistakes and inconsistencies in configurations of different protocols. This approach proved successful in finding a range of configuration errors. But because it does not build a model of the underlying network, it can have both false positives and false negatives and cannot answer questions about specific network behaviors.

(2) Analysis of individual environments. Testing tools such as Batfish [11] and C-BGP [22] take as input the network’s configuration and a concrete environment, simulate the resulting network behavior, and produce the data plane. The resulting network behavior and the data plane can be analyzed for properties of interest.

As noted earlier, the primary disadvantage of testing is that it can feasibly analyze only a small number of environments, while many configuration errors occur only in specific environments. However, unlike our approach, testing can support a more detailed analysis of individual environments (e.g., it can count the exact size of routing tables). Minesweeper employs configuration parsers of Batfish.

(3) Analysis of many environments. Our approach belongs to this class which can simultaneously analyze multiple environments by building an abstract network model. Prior work in this class includes FSR [26], ARC [12], ERA [9], and Bagpipe [27]. We borrow heavily from these works. FSR encodes BGP preferences using SMT constraints, our multi-protocol, logical view of the network (Figure 1) is similar to ARC, and our protocol-independent symbolic records (Figure 2) are similar to ERA. But our work goes beyond prior efforts in its scope and generality. We support the entire control plane functionality and a wider range of properties.

Dataplane analysis tools. Dataplane analysis tools such as Anteater [16] and HSA [14] have a simpler task than full network configuration analysis tools: they do not have to model the control-plane dynamics that can give rise to many possible data planes. In fact, a tool like Batfish will first simulate the control plane on a concrete environment, then produce a single dataplane, and finally use a dataplane analysis tool to verify properties. Hence, such data plane tools can be thought of as a special case (or subcomponent) of a testing tool. Though the task is simpler, and the specifics differ widely. Methodologically, the dataplane analysis tool most similar to our work was developed by Zhang [28]. They encode the network dataplane as a SAT formula and use combinatorial search, like we do, to find configuration errors.

Configuration synthesis. Network configuration synthesis [2, 18, 19] is complementary to verification. It uses a high-level design approach to generate configurations that are provably bug free or less likely to have bugs. Unlike verification, synthesis does not help check the correctness of configurations that already exist. But the two approaches may share network models. Our SMT-based control plane model has some similarity with a contemporary synthesis project [8], but there are significant differences as well. That effort uses a symbolic representation of network protocols based on stratified Datalog, such that the fixed point of the Datalog program represents the forwarding state of the network. The synthesis problem, of finding configuration inputs that satisfy specified properties, is effectively reduced to satisfiability checking of an SMT formula that is generated by using a specialized solver for stratified Datalog. In contrast, we do not restrict ourselves to stratified Datalog and use first order theories supported by SMT solvers to symbolically model the state of the network, without computing fixed points. We believe that our network model could also be used for finding configuration inputs that satisfy network-wide properties, but this is outside the scope of this paper.

10. CONCLUSIONS

We present the first general purpose symbolic model of both the network control and data planes based on encoding solutions to stable routing behavior as satisfying assignments to SMT formulas. Using this model, we show how to verify a wide variety of properties including reachability, fault-tolerance, router equivalence, and load balancing, both for all possible packets and all possible data planes that might emerge from the control plane. Using these ideas, we have implemented a tool called Minesweeper to verify properties for real network configurations. We evaluate Minesweeper on a collection of real and synthetic configurations, showing that it is effective at finding issues in real configurations and verifying properties of larger networks in minutes.

11. REFERENCES


